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[9] Abstract
In the Visuddhimagga, there is movement from an early Buddhist 
phenominalist epistemology towards essentialist ontology based in 
rationality and abstraction. The reductionist methodology of the 
Abhidhamma and reactions to it brought forth a theory of momentariness not
found in early Buddhism. Abhidhamma reductionism and the concept of 
phenomenal dhammas led to a conception of momentary time-points and 
the incorporation of a cinematic model of temporal consciousness as a direct
consequence of momentariness. Essentialism was incorporated into the 
Visuddhimagga precisely because of Buddhaghosa’s commitment to 
momentariness.  This is seen in Buddhaghosa’s treatment of karma and 
rebirth. Karma, particularly death-threshold karma, receives more emphasis 
in the Visuddhimagga than was previously found in the Suttas. This is due to 
the need to explain the continuity of the process of karmic rebirth in light of 
the theory of momentariness, making it necessary for Buddhaghosa to 
synthesise momentariness with the tri-temporal existence of the 
Sarvāstivādins. 
[10] Key Words: Karma, Rebirth, Time and Temporality, Buddhism, 
Buddhaghosa, Visuddhimagga
The concept of karma 
The literal definition of the Sanskrit word karma1 is action, particularly action 
of a ritual variety. The incorporation of karma into rebirth eschatologies 
appears to be a distinct feature of Indic thoughti and it is believed to have 
arisen from the ritual actions and sacrifices of the Brahminsii dating back to 
the Vedic period.iii In their simplest terms, or what Karl Potter called the 
“Classical Karma Theory of India”, karma theories declare that certain 
fundamental features of one’s present life, particularly “one’s birth, length of 
life and type of experiences”, are conditioned by one’s actions in previous 
existences and are outcomes of “one’s own past actions and no one else’s”.iv
With the exception of the Ājīvikas, who recognised the existence of karma 
but denied the efficacy of human action in conditioning rebirth,v and the 
Cārvakās, who denied both karma and rebirth, karma and rebirth are usually 
taken as functioning together in Indian eschatology. However, as 
Obeyesekere famously demonstrated, although rebirth eschatologies have 
been quite common in small-scale societies throughout history, only Indian 
rebirth eschatologies seem to have been ethicised by means of a theory of 
karma.vi 
[11] Given this historical context, it is unsurprising that an ethicised karmic 
rebirth eschatology is found in Buddhism. However, it is fair to say that the 
Buddha revolutionised both karma and rebirth by putting forth the doctrine 
of no-self / non-substantiality (anatta). Whereas other Indian karmic rebirth 
eschatologies depended on the existence of a substantial transmigrating self
/ soul (Sanskrit: atman), life monads (Sanskrit: jīva) or some other theorised 
substantial element, the Buddhist conceptions of karmic rebirth were centred
entirely in the notion of causality via the doctrine of dependent arising 
(paṭiccasamuppāda) and intention (cetanā).
When one explores the mechanisms of karmic rebirth in light of the doctrine 
of anatta, it becomes apparent that while Buddhism uses the same 
vocabulary as other Indic theories of karma and rebirth, the theories are 
actually quite different. The mechanism of karmic rebirth in other Indian 
religious philosophies was dependent on the reincarnation / transmigration of
a substantial soul or essence, whereas the Buddhist conception of rebirth, or 
1 Karma is not italicised in this article due to its now-common usage in English language, 
italicised words will be from the Pāli unless otherwise noted. References to the Pāli Canon 
will be used in the text (formatted in PTS version), while references to the Visuddhimagga 
will be cited in the chapter and verse format (Vism.Chapter.Verse). 
rebecoming (punabbhava), took great care to point to the non-existence of 
any substantial entity or essence capable of reincarnating or transmigrating. 
The lack of a substantial transmigrating entity led to philosophical difficulties
in explaining karmic continuity across existences. The Buddhist conception of
continuity in the absence of a substantial entity or essence is laid out in the
canon.  In  the  Suttas,  rebirth  is  the  logical  outcome  of  the  process
metaphysicsvii of  dependent  [12]  arising  (paṭiccasamuppāda),  with  karma
itself  acting  as  the  “strong  principle  of  continuity”viii across  a  potentially
infinite  succession  of  dependently  arisen  existences.  In  keeping  with  the
classification  of  the  Buddha’s  teaching  as  process  metaphysics,  or  what
Whitehead referred to as the “philosophy of organism”, ix karma is an organic
metaphor for causation.x A karmic act is likened to the planting of a seed
which  needs  many  other  conditions  like  rain,  sun  and  appropriate
temperature in order to bear fruit. Using a metaphor from the Bhava Sutta
(A.I.223), we can say that while an individual villager has little control over
the seed or rain necessary for his crop, he does have a great, if ultimately
limited, influence on the field in which the seed is planted. This is the field of
karma in early Buddhism.
However, aside from the general relation of karma to the process 
metaphysics of dependent arising, the particular mechanics of the karmic 
rebirth process are not detailed in the Suttas. The groundwork for explaining 
the functioning of a karmic rebirth mechanism is drawn from the 
Abhidhamma, and expanded on in the commentaries, with the emergence of
dhamma theory. Dhamma theory is the idea that “all the phenomena of 
empirical existence are made up of a number of elementary constituents, the
ultimate realities behind the manifest phenomena. These elementary 
constituents, the building blocks of experience, are called dhammas”.xi The 
mechanics of rebirth are demonstrated in this theory of dhammas by 
inferring continuity across time from the contiguity of the infinitesimal 
dhammas in sequential experience. 
[13] Early Buddhist karma theory 
Buddhist karma theory is primarily based on intention (cetanā) and produces
conditions of existence rather than retributive consequences in the form of
“rewards and punishments”.xii In other traditions, karma may be thought of
as an absolutistic and deterministic law of retribution. Among the Jains karma
was conceived of as a substance working in the physical realm, while among
the Ājīvikas, past karma was operative, but at the same time, impossible to
expiate and ultimately irrelevant to one’s escape from the rebirth process.xiii
Given the shared vocabulary among several different Indian traditions, it is
unremarkable  to  note  that  aspects  of  Buddhist  karma  theory  are  often
conflated with aspects of other Indic theories of karma. We contend that the
main  cause  of  these  misunderstandings  regarding  particularly  Buddhist
conceptions of karma is a tendency toward the conflation of multiple karmic
functions into one essentialist, overarching and unwieldy karmic theory. In
order to remedy this difficulty in the analysis of Buddhist karma, we must
examine the various aspects of all Indic karma theories separately and in
doing so, we find three major functions.xiv
1. Karma as causality;
2. Karma as ethical theory;
3. Karma and its relation to rebirth/ salvation from rebirth.
[14] In early Buddhism, the karma as causality functions descriptively to 
illustrate principles of causality and continuity in a conventional and 
instrumental relation to the larger process metaphysics of 
paṭiccasamuppāda, while the ethical and rebirth-oriented aspects of karma 
function normatively to affirm the efficacy of human action in leading a moral
life. Karma as causality describes why the circumstances of one’s life are the 
way they are. The ethical theory of karma demonstrates the efficacy of 
human action in changing one’s circumstances now and in the future. The 
relation of karma to rebirth both reaffirms the descriptive aspects of karmic 
causality and offers an avenue of escape via ultimate liberation from karma 
by the attainment of nibbāna. xv
All three facets of karma are derived from a phenomenological analysis of 
the world in which one perceives that while one has no control over the 
circumstances of one’s birth and only limited control of experiences resulting
from these circumstances, one does have the ability to bring about 
wholesome or otherwise positive results for oneself within society now and 
into the future, through engaging in “wholesome / skilful” (kusala) ethical 
action and thought.
In Buddhism, karma as an aspect of causality functions as a denial of 
determinism and an affirmation of the efficacy of human action, even if it is 
limited by circumstances beyond one’s control. This is best contrasted with 
the complete determinism of the Ājīvikas. [15] While Buddhism does not put 
forth an argument for complete freedom of will, it does leave space for moral
action. According to the Buddha, Ājīvika determinism and fatalism did not 
provide a valid reason for living a moral life (D.I.47; A.I.286; M.I.517) and the 
Buddha explicitly rejected this view. In fact, the Buddha declares that Ājīvika 
doctrine is the worst of all doctrines specifically because it denies “karma, 
deed and energy” (A.I.287) and proclaims (M.I.483) that no Ājīvika has made 
an end of suffering and that the only Ājīvika who was reborn in heaven over 
99 aeons was a believer in karma (kammavādin).
However, while the Buddhist notion of karma as causality rejects strong 
determinism, it also recognises the role that non-intentional and external 
conditions play in one’s experience and comprehends the presence of limits 
on complete freedom of action, with karma as only one of many causal 
factors involved in the present and possible future states of the individual 
(S.IV.230). It is precisely in this undetermined, but limited “field of action” 
(A.I.223) that intention and volitional action can operate and from which 
Buddhist conceptions of karma as causality can be coherently ethicised.
Karma as an ethical theory in Buddhism rests upon the move from karma as
action to karma as intention (A.III.410). Bronkhorst points out that “Buddhism
psychologised the notion of karmic retribution”,xvi by shifting away from the
emphasis on deed found in other Indian schools towards an emphasis on
desire  [16]  and  intention.  It  is  this  move  that  is  the  key  to  Buddhist
soteriology. The usual Indic view of karma as action and latent substance
leads to theories of liberation through inaction to avoid making new karma
coupled  with  austerities  to  annihilate  existing  karma.  In  contrast,  the
Buddhist theory of karma avoids inaction and austerities by focusing on the
elimination of  mental  defilement (kilesa) through psychological  practice.xvii
This is the essence of the Buddha’s “middle way” and it accommodates an
ethical  and  active  soteriology,  rather  than  one  based  on  immobility  and
austerity. 
Karma as an ethical theory may be said to presuppose the existence of a
moral  order,  a  moral  order  best  thought  of  as  an  explanatory  construct
rather than as a metaphysical concept like a “moral law”. This is due to the
philosophical  problems  inherent  in  the  existence  of  a  moral  law  in  the
absence of a moral “lawgiver”. While ethical aspects of karma are seen as
part of a predictable, yet undetermined, process in which unskilful (akusala)
intentions will tend to produce unpleasant results and vice-versa, it must be
remembered that  an  action  is  not  unskilful  or  “wrong” because it  brings
about  unpleasant results;  it  brings about  unpleasant  results  because it  is
wrong. 
Failure to make this distinction may result in a misunderstanding of karma as
a  strong  type  of  naturalistic  ethical  determinism.  While  there  is  some
canonical  support  for  an  intrinsic  moral  order  resembling  a  western
conception  of  poetic  “justice”,  such  as  the  lascivious male’s  [17]  three
rebirths as animals that were to be castrated (Thig. 437-4), the effects of a
karma are  not  to  be  understood  as  determined in  a  one-for-one  fashion.
Instead, they depend on the nature of the person and circumstances in which
the  karma  was  done,xviii (A.I.249)  as  part  of  an  “indeterminate  (yet  non-
random)  process”.xix  It  is  clear  from  the  Buddhist  rejection  of  Ājīvika
determinism in  regard  to  causality  that  any doctrine  of  karma as  strong
ethical determinism must also be rejected. It may be that since karma as an
ethical  theory is  primarily directed toward lay practitioners as a basis for
practical morality in Buddhist society, karmic depictions of poetic justice can
be  taken  as  evidence  of  a  doctrine  of  “moral  naturalism”xx and  /  or  as
pedagogical instruments to teach ethics to lay followers of the Buddha. 
The final point to be made regarding karma as an ethical doctrine is that it
inculcates in the practitioner a desire to consider the consequences not only
of their ethical actions, but to cultivate consistent moral practices, mentally,
physically and verbally, with the aim of affecting their intentions. Karma as
ethics  encourages humility  and selflessness  through contemplation of  the
innumerable  factors  in  the  process  of  dependent  arising  and  how  they
necessarily produce consequences. The ethics of karma also takes emphasis
away from abstract ethical thought experiments about the essence of “right”
and “wrong” and focuses effort on producing compassionate ethical actors
whose cultivated moral sensibilities continually inform their intentions and
actions when morally significant situations are presented to them.  
[18] The final aspect of early Buddhist karma theory is the function of karma
in  the  Buddhist  soteriological  project.  In  this  scheme,  karma  is  seen  as
something  to  be  overcome  and  ultimately  rendered  irrelevant  with  the
attainment of nibbāna. In other Indian schools which define karma as action
and the  fruit  of  action,  karma can only  be  annihilated through  the  most
extreme forms  of  inaction  and  immobility.  However,  due  to  the  Buddhist
conception of karma as intention, karma can be rendered inoperable through
a purification of the mind that results in actions that are free of the poisons
of greed (lobha), hatred (dosa) and delusion (moha), which causes them to
produce karma that is “neither dark nor bright with neither dark nor bright
ripening, that conduces to the exhaustion of karma” (M.I.387).
Karma in the Visuddhimagga
In this paper we are primarily concerned with the different aspects of karma
and  rebirth  as  presented  in  the  Visuddhimagga.  We  contend  that
Buddhaghosa brought into Theravada Buddhism an essentialism that is not
found in early Buddhism, due to a shift away from the process metaphysics
of the Nikāyas towards the sectarian Abhidhammic conceptions of atomistic
dhammas as  mind-independent,  elementary  constituents  of  existence;
followed by another shift toward a notion of dhammas as discrete, atomistic
time-moments  due  to  the  inclusion  of  a  theory  of  momentariness.xxi We
contend  that  there  was  an  increasing  shift  away  from  the  process
metaphysics [19] of the  Nikāyas toward an essentialist metaphysical view
from  the  time  of  the  schism  following  the  2nd Buddhist  Council  that
eventually  culminates  in  Buddhaghosa’s  synthesis  of  momentariness  with
the doctrines of karma and rebirth in the Visuddhimagga. 
This  subtle  shift  away  from process  metaphysics  to  essentialism was  an
effect of the doctrine of momentariness that developed logically from the
reductionist methodology of  the early Buddhists.  The Buddha himself  was
primarily a religious teacher concerned with salvation from suffering rather
than a builder of a systematic metaphysics, and as such left an incomplete
view  of  ontology.  Therefore,  the  metaphysics  of  early  Buddhism  closely
resemble process thought approached from a phenomenologically “realist”
perspective.  The  Sarvāstivādin  and  Vātasīputrīya  sects  approached  their
versions of Abhidhammic theory from the same realistic perspective as the
early  Buddhists,  which  led  to  the formation of  a  school  of  “personalism”
(Pudgalavādins) in the case of the Vātasīputrīyas and to the concept of tri-
temporal existence of dhammas (dhammas that exist in all three periods of
time, past, present and future) in the case of the Sarvāstivādins. Both the
personalism  of  the  Vātasīputrīyas  and  the  realism  of  the  Sarvāstivādins
would be vehemently opposed by the Sautrāntika and Madhyamaka sects as
forerunners of Yogācāra, while it would be left to Buddhaghosa to synthesise
the doctrines of the Sarvāstivādins and Sautrāntikas with the doctrines of the
Theravādins.
[20]  As  phenomena  were  reduced  in  the  various  sectarian  Abhidhamma
philosophies, this  reduction  to  dhammas conceived  of  as  the  smallest
perceptual  building  blocks  of  experience  resulted  in  a  tendency  to
reconstruct  them  as  discrete  ultimate  entities  (paramattha-dhamma).
Although, as Karunadasa contends, “In the Pāli tradition, it is only for the
sake of definition and description that each  dhamma is postulated as if it
were a separate entity”,xxii when the same logical reductionism that gave rise
to  dhamma theory was applied to time, a theory of momentariness arose.
This  atomistic  momentariness  of  time  was  ultimately  coupled  with  the
conception of  dhammas as discrete,  ultimate entities,  which introduced a
philosophical difficulty in accounting for continuity between these dhammas
conceived  of  as  discrete  time-moments.  Without  a  way  of  establishing
continuity between these time-moments, a great difficulty was also raised in
establishing  karmic  continuity  across  lives,  which  threatened  the  entire
soteriological project of Buddhism.
The Sarvāstivādins appear to have held fast to the realist phenomenology of
early  Buddhism,  but  with  an explicitly  eternalist  view of  time.  They fully
accepted the real existence of the past, present and future dhammas. Even
after adopting momentariness, the Sarvāstivādins continued to believe in the
past, present and future existence of dhammas, while attributing full causal
powers only to the momentarily present  dhammas. Furthermore, the entire
concept  of  past,  present  and  future  is  condensed  into  the  momentarily
present dhamma by defining the [21] “time-moment” as the interval in which
a dhamma arises, persists and perishes. This is the Sarvāstivādin theory of
tri-temporal  existence  and  it  was  also  vehemently  opposed  by  the
Madhyamaka and Sautrāntikas.
The Vātasīputrīya responded to the problem of karmic continuity across lives
by resorting to personalism, postulating the  puggala as a non-eternal, but
existing, personal entity to maintain personal identity in karmic rebirth. This
concept of puggala was taken to be heretical by the other sects at the time,
and it is certainly considered heretical by modern day Buddhists. However,
according to Hiuen Tsang in the 7th Century ACE, Pudgalavādins were the
most numerous of sects at that time in Indian Buddhism. Due to the strong
acceptance of Sarvāstivāda and Pudgalavāda in classical India, we contend
that it is likely that there was wide-spread doctrinal acceptance of ontological
realism  prevalent  in  classical  Indian  Buddhism  that  is  underappreciated
today.
The Madhyamaka rejected the entire concept of momentariness and denied
the  absolute  reality  of  time  itself  (as  well  as  the  entire  conception  of
dhammas, postulating that reality itself was a conceptual construct) on the
basis that the past, present and future cannot logically exist in each other
and  that  a  non-static  time  cannot  be  grasped  as  the  absolute  present
continues to flow into the past.xxiii 
The  Sautrāntikas  committed  themselves  to  non-substantiality  (anatta)  by
avoiding  essentialism  [22]  while  accepting  a  radical  momentariness  that
resulted  in  a  commitment  to  durationless  dhammas resembling
infinitesimals,  and  a  notion  of  radical  presentism in  regard  to  time.  The
Sautrāntikas  accepted a  cinematic  model  of  temporal  consciousness fully
and followed it to its logical conclusion by postulating  dhammas that arise
and cease without persistence or duration. This position is rigorously logical
in avoiding essentialism, but it does little to answer the question of how a
dhamma that ceases immediately upon arising can have causal  power or
continuity.  The Sautrāntikas  displayed  the  same  hard-headed  logical
consistency  and  attributed  on-going  causal  efficiency  to  the  series  of
moments rather than to the enduring effects of the individual momentary
dhammas.  They  banked  on  immediate  contiguity  to  account  for  change
rather  than  postulating  any  change  in  the  dhamma itself,  due  to  the
dhamma’s lack of persistence over time.  Instead, the dhamma’s activity was
reduced  to  its  existence.xxiv In  this  account,  time  is  no  more  than  the
succession  of  infinitesimal  dhammas perishing  immediately  after  their
origination.
Buddhaghosa dealt with the difficulty of establishing karmic continuity across
lives by inferring continuity from the contiguity of time-moments in line with
the Sautrāntikas. In the realm of karmic rebirth, this was accomplished via
the rebirth-linking consciousness (paṭisandhi-viññāṇa), which is postulated as
“existing” momentarily between the cessation of the death consciousness
(cuti-citta) and the arising of mentality-materiality (nama-rupa) and the life-
continuum consciousness (bhavaṅga-citta) at the moment of rebirth-linking.
The existence of the rebirth-linking consciousness is a logical necessity for
Buddhaghosa in order to explain the continuity between the processes of
death and rebirth in keeping with the Buddhist doctrine of non-substantiality
(anatta).  The  rebirth-linking  consciousness  is  inserted  to  avoid  any
troublesome  gaps  between  existences.  The  bhavaṅga-citta of  the  new
existence is simply classified as a resultant state of consciousness (vipaka-
citta) conditioned by the karma that in turn conditioned the rebirth-linking
consciousness of the previous existence (Vism.XI.2).
This is an elegant philosophical explanation of how continuity is maintained
across lives and a useful tool for meditation on this subject. It also accounts
for  the  ability  of  spiritual  adepts  to  recall  past  lives  by  tracing  one’s
continuity  of  subjective  experience  from  the  present  existence  back
(Vism.XIII.14). Even non-Buddhist adepts are said to be able to recall past
lives, but only as a succession of aggregates. Buddhists are said to have a
more privileged insight by tracing both the succession of  aggregates and
death and rebirth-linking, while a Buddha can skip the succession of births
and deaths in his own or another’s stream of consciousness (viññāṇa-sota)
and speak of any particular point at will (Vism.XIII.17). Finally, Buddhaghosa
is able to demonstrate the mechanism by which the arahant is liberated from
the cycle of existence (saṃsāra), with the attainment [24] of enlightenment
(nibbāna) stopping the formation of another rebirth-linking consciousness at
the  cessation  of  the  death  consciousness  in  the  present  lifetime
(Vism.XIV.124).  
Buddhaghosa  takes  as  his  premise  the  idea  that  just  as  one  conscious
moment invariably conditions the next conscious moment in one’s present
life,  the  death  consciousness  invariably  conditions  the  rebirth-linking
consciousness,  which  in  turn  conditions  the  resultant  consciousness  in
exactly  the  same  manner  as  in  the  present  succession  of  moments
(Vism.XVII.126). The entire metaphysics of the  Visuddhimagga depends on
this uninterrupted succession of dhammas as discrete time-moments. It is for
this reason that the common folk belief in the existence of an intermediate
state (antarābhava) is also denied in this metaphysical system to maintain
continuity (Vism.XIX.23).
Temporality and Momentariness in the Visuddhimagga
A  significant  problem  arises  in  putting  forth  a  metaphysically  satisfying
account  of  the  nature  of  continuity  inferred  from  the  succession  of
contiguous, momentary dhammas, of which the rebirth-linking consciousness
is just another example. The Sautrāntikas were only able to deal with this
issue by attributing causal  efficiency to the series of  moments with each
individual  dhamma fully  replicating  the  preceding  dhamma as  well  as
bringing  to  fruition  its  own  momentary,  individual,  causal  efficiency.  The
dhammas as wholly independent and [25] durationless time-moments can
combine  interdependently  with  other  dhammas,  but  cannot  interact  with
those other dhammas as they are each indivisible time-moments that cannot
exist long enough to be acted upon by each other or act as a catalyst.xxv 
The phenomenological realism of early Buddhism avoided this problem by
accepting a common-sense extensional model of temporal consciousnessxxvi
that accepted one’s immediate experience as constituting a succession of
finite temporal experiences, each with some duration over time, constituting
a “specious present”.xxvii This  is  similar to a Whiteheadian “actual  entity”,
whose very being is constituted by its process of becoming.xxviii These “drops
of  experience,  complex  and  interdependent”xxix can  accommodate  the
momentary  arising  and  cessation  of  phenomena  in  a  theory  of
momentariness  into  a  single,  conscious  perception  of  an  extensional
specious present that endures through a short period of time. This idea of an
extensional specious present that is a product of conscious perception of the
world,  but  which does not  rely  on the ontological  status  of  things  in  the
world,  supports  Kalupahana’s  assertion  that  early  Buddhism followed  the
“middle path” regarding time; rejecting both the concept of absolute time
and the hypothesis that time is an illusion of the intellect as two extremes.
Instead, the Buddha “seems to have considered time as an essential feature
of the universe and the experience of it”.xxx
[26] Likewise, in Whitehead’s  version of process metaphysics, the 
impossibility of perceiving an abstracted temporal location such as the 
“absolute present” is remedied while avoiding “the fallacy of misplaced 
concreteness”xxxi by postulating an “enduring physical object”,xxxii which is in 
reality, a nexus of processes functioning as “actual entities” (occasions of 
experience) in time. Much like dhammas, these “actual entities” are 
postulated purely as logically atomized instruments of definition and 
description rather than as ultimate entities. 
With  the  existence  of  an  explanation  in  early  Buddhism  that  does  not
contradict  the  doctrine  of  impermanence  (anicca)  and  coheres  with  the
dhamma theory of the Abhidhamma, why then does Buddhaghosa resort to
essentialism in his metaphysics? 
The simple answer is that while Buddhaghosa was careful to avoid attributing
metaphysical essence to the own-nature (sabhava) of dhammas he remained
committed to the theory of momentariness that arose from the application of
the reductionism used to create dhamma theory to the concept of time. The
addition  of  a  momentary,  atomised  conception  of  time  to  the  idea  of
dhammas as  elementary  constituents  of  existence  logically  led  to  the
conception of dhammas as atomistic time-moments along the lines of those
postulated by the Sautrāntikas.  This  created the aforementioned difficulty
with  causation  as  this  type of  momentary  dhamma could  not  be said  to
endure long enough to condition the successive  dhammas [27] that arise
following each dhamma’s cessation without granting dhammas some form of
substantiality,  essence  and  experiential  “thickness”.  It  also  created  a
problem with the idea of direct perception of the external world, to which
Buddhaghosa  and  many other  commentators  and philosophers  were  also
committed. 
An unwillingness to grant any substantiality to dhammas leads to a 
Sautrāntika type of “cinematic model of temporal consciousness” in which, 
“Our streams of consciousness are composed of continuous successions of 
these momentary states of consciousness... analogous to movies, which (as 
displayed) consist of rapid sequences of still images”.xxxiii This cinematic 
model of temporal consciousness is the usual end result when a reductionist 
methodology is applied to the concept of time. However, this model is 
subject to the serious objection that a succession of experiences is not the 
same thing as an experience of succession.xxxiv The Sautrāntikas maintained 
their commitment to the reduction of time by committing to the theory of 
representationalism rather than direct perception. 
The  Sautrāntika solution posed a great difficulty for Buddhaghosa because
he was committed to direct perception of dhammas as actual experiences of
events  in time, or even  as time,xxxv in the manner they were presented in
early Buddhism, while also being intellectually committed to the abstraction
of  momentariness.  While  the  Sautrāntika  commitment  to  avoiding
essentialism [28] and accepting momentariness resulted in a commitment to
durationless dhammas and radical presentism, the Sarvāstivādins resorted to
the concept of tri-temporal existence in which the  dhammas were said to
exist at all three periods of time; past, present and future. Other schools of
Indian  Buddhism  saw  the  Sarvāstivādin commitment  to  the  existence  of
dhammas in  all  time periods as the doctrine of  substantiality  by another
name,  but  it  had  the  advantages  of  complementing  the  doctrine  of
dependent arising (paṭiccasamuppāda) and accounting for the perception of
past  and  future  dhammas in  line  with  direct  perception.xxxvi However,
according  to  Karunadasa,  the  tri-temporal  theory  of  existence  introduced
among the Sarvāstivādins resulted in the emergence of:
A metaphysical dimension to the doctrine of dhammas and thus paved
the way for  the  erosion  of  its  empirical  foundation.  For  this  theory
makes an empirically unverifiable distinction between the actual being
of the  dhammas as phenomena and their ideal being as noumena. It
assumes that the substances of all  dhammas persist in all the three
divisions of time—past, present, and future—while their manifestations
as phenomena are impermanent and subject to change. Accordingly, a
dhamma actualizes itself only in the present moment of time, but “in
essence” it continues to subsist in all the three temporal periods. As is
well known, this resulted in the transformation of the dhamma theory
into a  svabhavavada, “the doctrine of own-nature.” It also paved the
way for a veiled recognition, if not for a categorical assumption, of the
[29] distinction between substance and quality.xxxvii
Given  Buddhaghosa’s  commitments  to  both  momentariness  and  direct
perception, he was forced to resort to this Sarvāstivādin essentialism in order
to underlie his metaphysics in the Visuddhimagga. He accomplished this by
incorporating  tri-temporal  existence  into  his  conception  of  dhammas by
conceiving of dhammas as containing within them (rather than existing in) all
three periods of time, past, present and future. 
Buddhaghosa accomplished this by way of the metaphysical postulation that
material  dhammas endure  longer  than  mental  dhammas,  by  a  ratio  of
sixteen  to  one  (Vism.XX.24).  This  allowed  Buddhaghosa  to  assign  a  tri-
temporal  categorisation  of  past,  present  and  future  (by  way  of  arising,
persisting and ceasing) to dhammas themselves, thus giving endowing them
with traditional  causal  efficiency; while at the same time maintaining the
concept of dhammas as discrete infinitesimal time-moments. This ingenious
concept  also  had  the  added  effect  of  maintaining  direct  perception  and
symmetrical causality. While direct perception and symmetrical causality are
not explicitly stated doctrines in early Buddhism, they do fit well with the
phenomenological realism of early Buddhism.
However,  Buddhaghosa’s  manoeuvre  succeeded  at  the  cost  of  ascribing
misplaced  concreteness  to  momentary  mental  dhammas in  order  to
differentiate them from momentary material  dhammas. It  also called into
question [30] the very definition of momentariness. Essentialism necessarily
emerges from this coupling and Buddhaghosa was forced to downplay the
phenomenological  and  empirically  asymmetric  nature  of  extensional
temporal  causality  found  in  early  Buddhism,  in  which  the  present  is
associated with becoming,xxxviii in favour of this new essentialist paradigm.
Although this appears to be a minor philosophical innovation undertaken in
order  to  harmonise  diverse  doctrines,  it  results  in  concretisation  of  the
doctrine of momentariness and a final shift away from non-substantiality in
Theravāda Buddhism.
The early Buddhist extensional model of temporal consciousness allowed the
contents of conscious perception to extend through time, and therefore had
no need of a theory of momentariness. It also allowed for the presence of
past events in the extensional consciousness without according them a type
of  ontological  existence  or  substantiality.  The  early  Buddhist  model  of
temporal consciousness is in line with the empirical and phenomenological
experience  of  a  “specious  present”  and  it  avoided  the  metaphysical
problems  of  a  lack  of  continuity  and  diachronic  complexity  found  in  the
cinematic  model  of  temporal  consciousness  used  by  the  reductionist
Sautrāntikas. While it seems that Buddhaghosa was aware of the danger in
attributing substance in the guise of own-nature (sabhava) to dhammas, he
was  less  attentive  to  the  problem  of  essentialism  arising  from  the
atomisation  of  time  via  the  theory  of  momentariness.  It  was  this  move
toward  an  analysis  of  existence  into  a  succession  of  [31]  discrete  time-
moments that fundamentally transformed Theravada Buddhist epistemology
into  an essentialist  enterprise.xxxix Ironically,  the  theory  of  momentariness
that arose in part to avoid the ideas of essentialism and enduring substances
became the vehicle by which essentialism entered Buddhaghosa’s thought.
We  contend  that  Buddhaghosa  could  not  simply  discard  the  theory  of
momentariness because he could not accommodate the asymmetric nature
of temporal  causality in trying to account for a durationless and abstract
“absolute  present”,  rather  than  an  extensional  specious  present.  In  the
experience of  time,  the “absolute present”  can only  be perceived as  the
past, as is found in retentional models of temporal consciousness,xl and the
causal impacts of the past on an unperceivable (absolute) present and future
are  necessarily  a  product  of  inference,  not  direct  perception,  due  to  the
asymmetrical nature of temporal causality.xli 
Buddhaghosa did recognise this problem of the “absolute present” when he
stated that while a material  dhamma’s ability to act as a causal condition
begins  with  the  arising  of  said  dhamma,  and  karma  can  only  condition
subsequent events when it is past (Vism.XIX.9). This is because the concept
of non-simultaneity means that karmic fruit cannot be said to ripen in the
present from karma that is simultaneously being created in the present. Of
course, Buddhaghosa’s concept of sixteen mental time moments occurring in
the  amount  of  time  allotted  [32]  for  the  passing  of  each  material  time-
moment means that the duration between past karma and its fruition could
be  infinitesimal.  Nevertheless,  the  idea  that  present  karma  cannot  bear
present fruit and that future karma obviously cannot bear fruit until it too is
past karma, does indicate that Buddhaghosa was aware of the difficulty in
attributing purposeful activity (including karma as intentional action) to any
time but the absolute past cognised as an extensional specious present. This
was also recognised by the Sautrāntikas, who also held to their commitment
to the theory of momentariness.  In throwing out the phenomenological and
empirical  experience  of  time in  favour  of  a  purely  logical  and  abstract
analysis  of  time, one invariably finishes with a conception of  durationless
moments of experience like those found in the cinematic model of temporal
consciousness.  It  was  this  logical  move  from an  extensional  model  to  a
cinematic  model  that  created  the  problem  of  demonstrating  continuity
between successive dhammas as well as between successive existences.
[33] Conclusion 
If one conceives of the cycle of existences as an uninterrupted succession of
subjective  experience,  whether  the  successive  experience  of  momentary
dhammas or Whiteheadian “actual entities”, the perceived gap separating
the  end  of  one  existence  and  the  beginning  of  the  next  existence
(Vism.XVII.164)  has  no  ontological  reality  (Vism.XIX.23)  and  is  not  an
obstacle  to  explanation.  However,  in  spite  of  acknowledging  the  lack  of
ontological reality for the perceived gap, Buddhaghosa cannot help but to fill
this  perceived  gap  with  the  rebirth-linking  consciousness  because  he  is
committed to an acceptance of the theory of momentariness.
Buddhaghosa is clear to point out that no factor is unconditioned and that 
rebirth is primarily a result of conditioned desire throwing one forth into 
renewed existence. However, in emphasising the effects of karma and 
constructions / dispositions (saṅkhāra), whether good, bad or indeterminate 
(Vism.XIV.129), as the primary driver of the conditions of existence across 
lives, we begin to see the emergence of a more essentialist metaphysics of 
rebirth, which leads to a more ethically deterministic interpretation of karma 
than that found in early Buddhism. This is one reason why we see 
Buddhaghosa’s metaphysics attach primary importance to the karma that 
manifests itself before death (thereby directly conditioning the rebirth-linking
consciousness), and why his four-fold classification of karmas that [34] 
manifest as rebirth-linking (Vism.XIX.15) emphasises weighty, habitual and 
death-threshold karmas as distinct from other accumulated karmas. This is in
contrast to the depiction of karma in relation to one’s overall behaviour that 
is found in the Suttas and is a direct result of the fact that for Buddhaghosa, 
a particular “karma, sign of karma or sign of destiny”  (Vism.XIV.111) must 
appear at the time of death as an object for the rebirth-linking 
consciousness. 
While there is canonical support for the idea that death-threshold karma can 
be particularly significant (M.III.214), McDermott points out that the Buddha 
emphasises that it is the totality of a man’s character that may shape his 
thoughts at the moment of death.xlii While the idea of death-threshold karma 
(or weighty / habitual karmas manifesting as or influencing death-threshold 
karma) directing the rebirth process is plausible in most cases, it fails to 
account for cases such as that where one is unconscious at the moment of 
death. Therefore, it is likely that while admitting death-threshold karma may 
be particularly significant, the Buddha emphasised it far less than 
Buddhaghosa does in the Visuddhimagga. We contend that this is due to the 
logical necessities found in the metaphysical systematisation undertaken by 
Buddhaghosa and in his acceptance of momentariness. Buddhaghosa’s 
entire metaphysics depends on the succession of momentary dhammas 
conditioned by karma and karmic constructions to provide an object for the 
rebirth-linking consciousness. 
[35]  Therefore,  Buddhaghosa  was  left  to  formulate  a  way  in  which  the
contiguous and sequential  dhammas could exert causal influence on each
other while still maintaining that these same dhammas existed momentarily.
He did so by classifying a moment as encompassing the entire process of
arising, presence, and dissolution of a  dhamma (Vism.XIV.190) and through
an emphasis on an “unconscious” consciousness called the life-continuum
(bhavaṅga).xliii The  former  move  of  incorporating  the  three  stages  of  tri-
temporal existence within a single momentary  dhamma allowed  dhammas
causal  efficacy  while  the  life-continuum provided  a  type  of  metaphysical
substrate  on  which  mental  continuity  could  be  established.  This
transformation  and  commitment  to  essentialism  is  the  reason  that
Buddhaghosa is  forced to assign a more decisive role to the influence of
karma, over and above other causal factors, in shaping the process of rebirth
than that which is found in the Suttas.
While the aforementioned accounting of the rebirth process is quite elegant
and speaks to the desire for a rationalised and systematised accounting of
karmic rebirth, we begin to see a move away from karma as one part among
many (S.IV.230)  in  a larger chain of  causality,  including rebirth,  toward a
growing  emphasis  on  karma  as  a  decisive  conditioning  factor  in  an
essentialist metaphysical system of karmic conditioning. In turn this leads to
a tendency to conflate the Buddhist  doctrine of  karma with determinism,
leading to a tendency among some Buddhist laypersons to see the karma in
an overly deterministic or retributive light. 
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